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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the causal effects of public and private debts on U.S. output dynamics. 
We estimate a battery of Cointegrated Structural Vector Autoregressive models, and we identify 
structural shocks by employing Independent Component Analysis, a data-driven technique which 
avoids ad-hoc identification choices. The econometric results suggest that the impact of debt on 
economic activity is Janus-faced. Public debt shocks have positive and persistent influence on 
economic activity. In contrast, rising private debt has a milder positive impact on GDP, but it fades out 
over time.  The analysis of the possible transmission mechanisms reveals that public debt crowds in 
private consumption and investment. In contrast, mortgage debt fuels consumption and output in the 
short-run, but shrinks them in the medium-run. 
 
 
JEL Codes: E32, E62, C58, H63. 
Keywords: Public and Private Debt, Business Cycle Fluctuations, Independent Component Analysis, 
SVAR Identification. 
 
             
 
                                                            
a. Corresponding author: mattia.guerini@sciencespo.fr  
b. Also Université Côte d'Azur, SKEMA, CNRS, GREDEG (France). 
 
1 Introduction
This work empirically investigates the economic impact of private and public debts, by employing a battery
of Cointegrated Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) models, whose structural coecients are identied
employing a recently developed data-driven methodology. Our goal is to contribute to the recent debate about
the role that dierent types of debt can have on economic dynamics.
The nancial and economic crises of 2008 have intimately been intertwined with the dynamics of debt.1
On the one hand, U.S. rm and household debts have been growing since the sixties until the outburst of the
subprime real asset bubble in 2008 (see also Figure 1, panels B and D). On the other hand, in the aftermath
the Great Recession, U.S. public debt has skyrocketed from 60% to more than 100% of GDP (see gure 1,
panel A), raising concerns about the sustainability of public nances, and more generally, about the possible
detrimental eects of public debt on economic growth (Reinhart and Rogo, 2010a).
One of the most accepted narratives of the underlying causal mechanisms linking public and private
debts to real output dynamics dates back to the seminal work of Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1986), and it has
recently revived by a blossoming number of contributions (from Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993 and Bernanke
et al., 1999 all the way to Koo, 2008, Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012, Gertler et al., 2010, Delli Gatti et al.,
2010, Dosi et al., 2013, 2015, and the survey in Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Buoyant credit fuels debt and asset
prices bubbles, which eventually get bust when a loss of condence occurs. The consequent sharp fall in asset
prices considerably worsens the balance sheets of banks, freezing interbank markets and triggering credit
rationing and ight to quality phenomena. In turn, the fall in private consumption and investment paves
the way to deationary pressures, which increase the real value of debt contracts and further worsen the
nancial conditions of borrowers. In addition, default cascades and bank runs may lead to the collapse of
some nancial institutions. Eventually, governments must intervene by increasing decit and public debt,
possibly transforming a private debt crisis in sovereign one.
In line with the previous theoretical developments, a wide consensus has emerged at the empirical level
about the detrimental eect of excessive credit growth on economic dynamics (see in particular Mian and
Su, 2009, 2011; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jorda et al., 2013, 2016; Mian et al., 2015; Turner, 2015). These
works provide robust evidence about the fact that high level of households debt and upsurges in house prices
have a great explanatory power for the generation of nancial crises.
On the contrary, the debate about the role of excessive public debt on macroeconomic dynamics is still
open also due to scarcer available data. Empirical works have tried to detect thresholds above which public
debt becomes detrimental for economic growth, and, more generally, to study the existence of a causal eects
between public debt and economic growth (see Reinhart and Rogo, 2010a,b; Reinhart et al., 2012; Herndon
et al., 2013; Cecchetti et al., 2011; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2010; Panizza and Presbitero, 2014; Egert,
2015; Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015).2 These works typically employ panel-data models and rely on annual
observations from several countries. The obtained mixed results suer from dierent econometric problems.
Apart from the usual issue of endogeneity, another technical hurdle relates to the adoption of panel-data
regressions, which implicitly assumes that the causal eect of public debt on economic growth is homogenous
in all the countries in the dataset (except for country-specic xed eects). To our knowledge, the only
1More generally, Ng and Wright (2013), nd in the last thirty years all U.S. recessions have nancial origins.
2See the survey by Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a more detailed discussion.
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Figure 1: Various measures of debt-to-GDP. The vertical dashed line represent 2007:Q4.
exception is the work by Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), who show the importance of country heterogeneity
employing kernel estimations.3. Finally, Jorda et al. (2014) argue that expansionary scal policies lose their
grip if the economy enters into a nancial crisis with an existing high level of public debt-to-GDP ratio.
In this work, we contribute to the aforementioned empirical research by jointly investigating the impact
of public and private debt on U.S. GDP dynamics, employing a series of cointegrated SVAR models (Johansen,
1995). Our work improves upon the existing literature in several respects. First, the cointegrated SVAR ap-
proach is a way to tackle endogeneity, which has been one of the most delicate issue in the literature about
public and private debt so far, and to study the dynamics eects of debt on macroeconomic variables both
in the short- and in the medium-run. Second, we disentangle between dierent types of private debt (rm
and household debt). Third, we investigate possible transmission mechanisms from private and public debt to
GDP, assessing the possible crowding-out or crowding-in eects on consumption and investment. Finally, we
identify structural relations by using data-driven causal search algorithms (Indipendent Component Analysis
- ICA - see Moneta et al., 2013; Gourieroux et al., 2017). The ICA procedure allows us to identify structural
private and public debt shocks by “letting the data speak”, i.e. without resorting to any ad-hoc procedure
grounded on economic theory.
We nd that public debt shocks positively and persistently aect output. In that, our results thus provide
3In particular, estimating a pooled model suggests the presence of an inversely U-shaped curve, but when country heterogeneity
is accounted for, the curve becomes U-shaped for most of the countries (see gure 2 in Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015).
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further evidence against the hypothesis that higher levels of public debt hamper GDP growth (Reinhart and
Rogo, 2010a). In fact, surges in public debt crowd-in private consumption and investment (Woodford, 1990;
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; Stiglitz, 2012), thus spurring output both in the short- and in the medium-run.
On the contrary, this does not appear to be the case for private debt shocks. More specically, we nd that
the positive eects of private debt shocks are milder than public debt’s ones, and they fade out over time.
Moreover, increasing levels of mortgage debt have a negative impact on output dynamics in the medium-
run. Such a result appears to be consistent with the hypothesis that mortgage debt inates real asset bubbles,
whose outburst triggers nancial crises. (Mian and Su, 2009). Finally, we nd that the main econometric
results are robust to dierent model specications and to the inclusions of the Great Recession observations.
Our results suggest that debt is Janus-faced: dierent types of debt impact dierently on economic dynam-
ics. In particular, possible menaces to medium- and long-run output growth do not come from government
debt, but rather from increasing levels of private debt. In particular, surges in household debt appear to be
much more dangerous than increases in corporate debt.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe respectively the estimation technique and
the data. Sections 4 and 5 present the main results and the robustness exercises. Section 6 concludes. Two
appendices integrate the paper with additional technical explanations.
2 Methodology
We estimate our multivariate time series model by means of a Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive (CVAR)
model in its transitory formulation, using the Johansen (1995) procedure (see also Lutkepohl, 1991). Being Yt
the k × 1 vector of variables object of investigation, the model of interest is specied as:
∆Yt = ΠYt−1 + Θ1∆Yt−1 + · · ·+ Θp−1∆Yt−p+1 + ut, (1)
where Π and Θi (i = 1, . . . , p− 1) are k × k matrices and ut is a k × 1 vector of error terms. Naturally, the
model can also be rewritten in the more “standard” VAR specication:
Yt = A1Yt−1 + · · ·+ ApYt−p + ut (2)
with Θi = −(Ai+1+ · · ·+Ap), for i = 1, . . . ,p−1 and Π = αβt = −(I−A1−· · ·−Ap). The matrix Π
represents the error correction term composed by the loading matrix α and by the cointegration vector βt.
Estimation of the model in equation 1 is preferred since it allows the estimation of the possible existing
cointegrating relations which are contained in βtYt−1, coping with the possible common trends and with
the non-stationarity that our variables of interest might exhibit.
Both equations 1 and 2 are reduced-form models and share the same vector of residuals ut. By rotating
the reduced form models, pre-multiplying both sides of the equation by a matrix Γ0, one can obtain the
Structural-VAR (SVAR) model, where structural shocks εt are meant to represent the “true” economic shocks
aecting the system:
Γ0Yt = Γ1Yt−1 + · · ·+ ΓpYt−p + εt (3)
where Γi = Γ0Ai for i = 1, . . . ,p and εt = Γ0ut. However, even by assuming orthogonal structural shocks,
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the identication problem requires k(k − 1)/2 restrictions on the matrix Γ0. Such restrictions are typically
derived from economic theory, and therefore additional assumptions and subjective choices are required. The
standard solution to this problem is the Cholesky decomposition, which requires the assumptions of both
contemporaneous acyclicity and specic causal order, dictated by economic theory.
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) allows us to relax the second assumption by recovering the matrix
Γ0 with a data-driven procedure (see Hyvarinen et al., 2010; Moneta et al., 2013; Gourieroux et al., 2017).4
In this way, the causal order of the SVAR is not dictated by debatable theoretical considerations, but one can
achieve identication by letting the data speak. More specically, given ut = Γ−10 εt, the ICA approach focuses
on the interpretation of the reduced form residuals ut as linear combinations of the structural shocks εt which
have been combined by the mixing matrix Γ−10 . Under the assumptions that (i) ε1t, . . . , εkt are mutually
independent (i.e. the joint probability density function factorizes as f(ε1t, . . . , εkt) = f(ε1t) · . . . · f(εkt));
and (ii) each shock ε1t, . . . , εkt is not normally distributed (with the exception of at most one Gaussian shock),
ICA is able to recover the matrix Γ0. The gist of the ICA approach5 is to search among all the possible
linear combinations of ut, the one that minimizes their mutual statistical dependence, measured by mutual
information, dened as:
I(x1t, . . . , xkt) =
k∑
i=1
H(xit)−H(xt), (4)
where H is the dierential entropy6 and xt = (x1t, . . . , xkt)′ is a vector of linear combinations of ut =
(u1t, . . . , ukt)
′. It turns out that the “directions” (i.e. transformations of the data) that minimizes mutual
information can be found only if the data are non-Gaussian as Gaussian variables have the largest entropy
among all random variables of equal variance.7
Following Hyvarinen et al. (2010), we also assume that the VAR residuals ut can be represented as a Linear
Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM), so that the contemporaneous causal structure can be represented as a
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). This assumption allows us to apply a causal search algorithm, such as the one
presented in Appendix A (see Shimizu et al., 2006; Hyvarinen et al., 2010; Moneta et al., 2013), which allows
us to achieve a data-driven identication, directly comparable to a Cholesky decomposition, without any a
priori theoretical commitment.
After having identied and estimated the model in its structural form, in order to analyze the eects that
a shock to a debt variable has on GDP, we estimate Impulse Response Functions (IRF) with their bootstrapped
condence intervals and we formally test whether the eects are signicantly dierent from zero. Following
Lutkepohl (1991), the impulse response analysis in cointegrated systems can be conducted in the same way
as for stationary systems, hence no particular issue in the estimation of IRF arises. In particular, to estimate
4This identication strategy builds on the previous works by by Swanson and Granger (1997); Bessler and Lee (2002); Demiralp
and Hoover (2003); Moneta (2008). Recently also Bayesian strategies have been used to tackle the same issue (see Ahelegbey et al.,
2016).
5For more details about Independent Component Analysis, its assumptions, algorithms and related concepts see Hyvarinen et al.
(2001) and references therein.
6The dierential entropy H of a random vector x with probability density f(x) is dened as H(x) = − ∫ f(x) log f(x)dx.
7It also turns out that the independent components ε1t, . . . , εkt can be estimated by minimizing mutual information or, equiva-
lently, by nding linear combinations of the data in which negentropy, a measure of non-Gaussianity, is maximized. Negentropy J
of a random vector x with dierential entropy H(x) is dened as J(x) = H(xgauss) − H(x), where xgauss is a Gaussian random
variable of the same covariance matrix as x.
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Label Variable Description
Y Real Gross Domestic Product
B Real Federal Debt: Total Public Debt
L Real Total Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector
F Real Non-Financial Corporate Business Debt Securities
H Real Mortgage Debt Outstanding
I Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation
C Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
G Real Government Expenditures
R3m 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
R10y 10-Year Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
P Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deator, Index 2009=100
Table 1: Data description. The only two additional variables not inserted in the table which have been adopted
for the robustness checks are the consumption-specic and the investment-specic deators.
the IRF of the model one computes the vector moving average form of the model
Yt =
∞∑
s=0
Φsut−s (5)
in which Φ0 = I and (for s = 1, 2 . . .), Φs =
∑s
j=1 AjΦs−j (where Aj = 0 for j > p). The impulse
responses of the elements of Yt to the structural shocks εt−s (s = 0, 1, 2, . . .) corresponds to the matrices
Ψs (s = 0, 1, 2, . . .) dened as: Ψ0 = Γ−10 and (for s = 1, 2, . . .) Ψs =
∑s
j=1 AjΨs−j. In the empirical
results below, each impulse response function to the shock εtj is multiplied by the standard deviation of εtj ,
so that the responses display the eect of a one-standard-deviation shock.
3 Data
We employ US quarterly data drawn from the FRED database, released by the Federal Reserve of St Louis
(https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/). We focus on the US, because our estimation and identi-
cation strategies require suciently long time series, which, in the case of quarterly private and mortgage
debt, are publicly available only for this country. Our main sample ranges from the rst quarter of 1966 to
the last quarter of 2015. The variables and their summary statistics are presented in table 1 and in gure 2.
Beyond GDP and dierent public and private debt series, we have also included in our dataset consumption,
investment, government expenditure, 3-months and 10-years T-Bill rates to shed light on the possible pres-
ence and direction of relevant transmission mechanisms. All the variables have been downloaded in nominal
terms and have been then deated by means of the GDP implicit price deator (see last line of table 1). How-
ever, to control for possible biases introduced by the use of a common deator for all the variables, we have
also performed some robustness check exercises adopting investment and consumption specic deators (see
table 3 for more details).
The cross correlations between the log-dierences of the variables (see gure 2) provide the rst glimpse
of the underlying relations. First, with the exception of consumption, the correlations between public debt
and all the other variables are negative. Private debt instead, measured by the total amount of credit to the
private non-nancial sector, is positively correlated with all the other variables in the study. This also holds
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Figure 2: Cross correlations of the investigated stationarized variables.
when we disaggregate the series into corporate and household debts (the only exceptions are the correlations
between corporate debt and investment and interest rates.).
Before estimating a battery of CVAR models, we study the integration order of the time series employing
the Phillips and Perron (1988) test. We cannot reject the null hypothesis (H0 = “Presence of unit root”) for
all the variables in level (see table 2). On the contrary, the test rejects the null for all the variables in rst
dierence. This suggests that all the variables of interest have one unit root.
All the models in this work share the the reduced-form specication of equation 1, estimated using the
Johansen and Juselius (1990) maximum likelihood procedure, which Silvapulle and Podivinsky (2000) demon-
strate to be reasonably robust under departures from normality. The vector-error correction model specica-
Level Dierence
Variable PP-test p-Value PP-test p-Value
Y -1.1056 0.9193 -10.2842 0.01
B -2.3184 0.4428 -9.3683 0.01
L -0.5299 0.9796 -8.4035 0.01
F -1.3161 0.8625 -8.8052 0.01
H -0.1825 0.9900 -4.0346 0.01
I -1.7969 0.6611 -8.0843 0.01
C -0.8974 0.9514 -10.4661 0.01
G -0.6104 0.9760 -11.9081 0.01
R3m -2.7281 0.2713 -11.0075 0.01
R10y -2.2819 0.4581 -10.9693 0.01
Table 2: Phillips-Perron test for stationarity.
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Model Variables Lag number (p) Cointegrarion relations (r) Time period
1 Y, B, L, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 5 1 1966 - 2015
2 Y, B, L, I, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 1 2 1966 - 2015
3 Y, B, L, C, R3m AIC: 6, HQ: 5, BIC: 1 2 1966 - 2015
4 Y, B, F, I, R3m AIC: 8, HQ: 5, BIC: 2 2 1966 - 2015
5 Y, B, H, C, R3m AIC: 6, HQ: 4, BIC: 2 1 1966 - 2015
1nc Y, B, L, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 5, BIC: 3 1 1966 - 2007
2df Y, B, L, I, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 1 1 1966 - 2015
3df Y, B, L, C, R3m AIC: 6, HQ: 5, BIC: 1 1 1966 - 2015
6 Y, B, L, R10y AIC: 9, HQ: 5, BIC: 3 1 1966 - 2015
7 Y, B, L, G, R10y AIC: 9, HQ: 5, BIC: 1 2 1966 - 2015
1r Y, B/Y, L/Y, R3m AIC: 10, HQ: 6, BIC: 5 1 1966 - 2015
8 Y, B, F, H, C, I, R3m AIC: 7, HQ: 2, BIC: 1 3 1966 - 2015
8r Y, B/Y, F/Y, H/Y, C, I, R3m AIC: 7, HQ: 2, BIC: 1 3 1966 - 2015
Table 3: CVAR model specications. settings. Subscripts nc, df and r stand respectively for “no-crisis” for
“alternative deator” and for “debt measured as a ratio to GDP”. The acronyms AIC, HQ, BIC represent the
standard information criteria: the adopted one has been written in bold character.
tion allows us to exploit the information stemming from possible cointegrating relationships.
4 Econometric Results
In this section, we employ a battery of CVAR models, identied according to the data-driven ICA procedure,
to investigate the eects of public and private debt on the dynamics of output, consumption and investment.
The baseline specication includes GDP, total public debt, total credit to private (non-nancial) sector, and the
three-month T-Bill interest rate. We then augment the benchmark model, considering private consumption,
rm investment, disaggregating private debt in corporate business and mortgage debt series. All the estimated
model specications are reported in table 3, together with the reference period (1966-2015 in the benchmark
specication), the lag number p suggested by standard information criteria,8 and the tested number r of
cointegration relations.
Before discussing the results derived from the identication of the structural model, we show in table
4 the estimated cointegration relations. Indeed, as discussed in Johansen and Juselius (1994), the long-run
parameters β is the same both in the reduced and structural forms, implying that the identication of the
cointegration relations can be performed already in the reduced form.9 Table 4 shows positive bivariate long-
run relationships between GDP and each of the debt series.
In what follows, we rst describe the results derived from the benchmark structural model (cf. section 4.1).
We then present in section 4.2 the results of the model augmented with the consumption or investment series.
In section 4.3, we report the ndings obtained employing disaggregated private debt series, also studying the
crowding-out vis-à-vis crowding-in eects of public debt shocks on private consumption and investment.
8The bold in the lag selection corresponds to our choice. Where possible, we have adopted the Bayes-Schwartz Criterion (BIC).
In the cases in which the adoption of such a criterion was a poor one (because residuals displayed some correlation structure) we
have selected the more parsimonious between the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Hannan–Quinn Criterion (HQ). All
the cointegration relations are estimated with a constant trend.
9Note that discrepancies between cointegration relations and impulse-response functions are in principle possible, since cointe-
gration suggests a co-movement or mutual attraction among a set of variables, while an impulse response function provides the eect
(over time) of an exogenous intervention on a single variable on another variable.
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Variable ID 1 ID 2 (r=2) ID 3 (r=2) ID 4 (r=2) ID 5
Y 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
B -0.0052 0 1 0 1 0 1 -0.1763
L -0.7092 -3.3690 -21.2617 -0.5813 -22.9709
F -0.3506 -2.1589
H -0.3714
I 3.6784 27.6748 -0.4433 1.7958
C -0.1832 29.1448 -0.1634
R -1.2553 -10.7382 -71.2981 -1.1836 -25.0376 0.3161 2.6357 -1.8142
const. -5.7968 1.0895 54.1615 -4.8187 -151.8507 -7.4530 -0.1093 -5.5472
Table 4: Estimated cointegration relations (βt).
4.1 Baseline model
The baseline regression we consider here is a four-dimensional CVAR containing output, government debt,
private debt, ant the 3-months T-Bill interest rate (cf. table 3). The latter variable controls also for possible
monetary-policy eects.
Figure 3 shows the causal matrices of the structural CVAR model, identied with the ICA data-driven
causal search procedure. The rst matrix on the left (lag 0) represents B = I − Γ0. The “agnostic” selec-
tion identication strategy for the Cholesky decomposition suggests a contemporaneous causal structure in
which only private debt has a positive eect on GDP. The other two variables does not seem to have any
contemporaneous impact.
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Figure 3: SVAR causal matrices up to the 2nd lag for the baseline model 1. The variables below the matrices
cause the ones on the left.
Let us now consider the impact of public and private debts on GDP dynamics. The estimated impulse
response functions (IRFs) are depicted in gure 4.10 We nd that a positive shock to public debt persistently
and positively spurs output growth. Such a result contributes to the debate on the positive or negative ef-
fect of public debt on GDP growth with a fresh piece of evidence obtained with a data-driven identication
methodology in a cointegrated VAR framework. In that, it should be immune of possible theoretical choices
and biases. In line with the evidence discussed in the introduction (see Jorda et al., 2013), private debt shocks
10The IRFs are robust to dierent model estimation strategy, such as the level-VAR estimated with OLS. The represented condence
intervals are calculated via bootstrapping for the 5% and at the 95% levels. Note that the fact that the IRFs do not necessarily converge
to zero level is due to the fact that we estimate the model in level, which is consistent with the Johansen (1995) procedure.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions, model 1. Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation shock to public
debt (upper panel) and to private debt (lower panel). 95% condence bands obtained via bootstrap.
increase GDP in the short-run, but have negligible eects on output at longer horizons (cf. gure 4).
4.2 Augmented models
Let us now augment the baseline model (cf. table 3) by adding either aggregate investment (model 2) or
private consumption (model 3). The richer specications could shed further light on the possible transmission
mechanisms of private and public debt.
Figure 5 represents the matrices of the structural VARs for the models 2 (top row) and 3 (bottom row).
The change of variables between the two models leads to quite dierent contemporaneous causal structures,
which our identication strategy is exible enough to capture. In model 2, GDP pushes private debt and
private investment, suggesting the possible presence of an accelerator mechanism (see gure 5). The positive
eect of private debt on investment highlights the link between the nancial structure of rms and households
and their real decisions about investment. In model 3, instead, the unique signicant contemporaneous causal
eect is played by consumption on output, which is in line with the co-movements found by Stock and Watson
(1999) in the U.S. at the business cycle frequencies. While the dierences in the observed causal structures
of the three models could be possibly be due to the dierent variables included in the cointegrated SVARs,
the causal matrices at lags one and two are pretty similar and consistent also with the ones of the baseline
specication (cf. gure 5).
The impulse response functions (gure 6) reinforce the results obtained in the benchmark specication.
In line with the IRF of model 1, public debt shocks still do cause higher output. On the contrary, private debt
shocks have a positive and milder impact in the short-run, but negative eects in the medium-run. In order
to further investigate such results, in the next section, we consider disaggregated private debt series.
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Figure 5: SVAR causal matrices up to the second lag for the augmented models 2 (top panels) and 3 (bottom
panels). The variables below the matrices cause the ones on the left.
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions, models 2 (left) and 3 (right). Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation
shock to public debt (upper panels) and to private debt (lower panels). 95% condence bands obtained via
bootstrap.
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4.3 Disaggregated models
We decompose the total private debt into its two main components: mortgage and corporate debts. This
allows us to address the possible issue of having selected a bad proxy for aggregate private debt (even if it
has been extensively used in the literature, see e.g. Jorda et al., 2014). Moreover, such a decomposition allows
us to better understand how debt to dierent microeconomic actors (i.e. households and rms) can impact
dierently on output dynamics.
The new CVAR specications adds to GDP, public debt and the 3-month T-Bill interest rate either corporate
business debt and investment or mortgage debt and private consumption (cf. models 4 and 5 in table 3). The
causal SVAR matrices for the scenario with disaggregated private debt series are presented in gure 7. The
causal structure of the two models is very similar to the one of models 2 and 3 (cf. gure 5), suggesting that
the dynamics of disaggregated private debt series is akin to the one of private debt. Moreover, lagged eects
are consistent with all the previous regressions, thus further conrming that the “simple” baseline model is
able to capture the lag structure.
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Figure 7: SVAR causal matrices up to the second lag for the disaggregated models 4 (top panels) and 5 (bottom
panels). The variables below the matrices cause the ones on the left.
The impact of public, corporate and mortgages debt shocks are reported in the IRFs in gure 4.3. In
line with our previous results, the eects of public debt shocks remain positive both in the short- and in the
medium-run. The IRFs of mortgage and corporate debt provide a better understanding of the origin of the
long-term negative eects of private debt. Indeed, we nd that while corporate debt (left panel) has positive
eects on GDP dynamics similar to those of public debt, mortgage debt shows strong negative eects in
12
the medium-run (cf. gure 4.3).11 Mortgage debt appears to be the main driver of aggregate private debt
dynamics. The negative eects of mortgage credit may be due to its inating impact on real asset prices,
which possibly contribute to the emergence of bubbles (see Jorda et al., 2016). The positive eect of corporate
debt on investment shows the positive link between credit and rms’ real decisions.
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions, models 4 (left) and 5 (right). Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation
shock to public debt (upper panels), to corporate debt (lower left panel) and to mortgage debt (lower right
panel). 95% condence bands obtained via bootstrap.
We now consider the reaction of private consumption and investment as to public and private debt shocks.
In that, we also study the crowding-out or crowding-in eects of public expenditure and public debt. The
textbook crowding-out hypothesis suggest a competing role between government and private expenditures:
higher public consumption simply replaces private one or investment, even if government runs decit and
increases its debt (see Barro, 1974, 1989). On the contrary, the crowding-in hypothesis implies that government
decit not only does not “steal” any opportunity for the private sector, but it also spurs consumption and
investment via higher aggregate demand (Woodford, 1990; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; Stiglitz, 2012).
The IRFs in gure 4.3 show the eects of public and private disaggregated debt shocks on aggregate private
consumption and investment. Similarly to what happens to GDP, the IRFs suggest that public debt shocks have
positive and persistent eects on both consumption and investment. Corporate debt also bear positive eects,
on investment. Such results provide fresh new evidence supporting the crowding-in hypothesis. Instead,
household debt boosts consumption only in the very short run, while the eects turn negative in the medium
run, supporting once again the evidence showed above. Such a result might also be partially due to the
increased ratio between adjustable-rate mortgages and xed-rate ones that has occurred in the U.S. between
2000 and 2007 (see Furlong and Takhtamanova, 2012).12
11The negative long-run response of GDP to household debt shocks might be considered in contrast with the positive cointegrating
relationship between the two variables. However, the equivalence between cointegrating relationship and causality among a set of
variable is problematic, as it does not suggest a causal direction. This is why one should refer to the results produced by structural
models.
12Adjustable-rate mortgages are indeed characterized by a low and xed interest rate for the rst two or three years (and indeed
13
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions, models 4 (left) and 5 (right). Response of investment (left) and con-
sumption (right) to a 1% standard deviation shock to public debt (upper panels), to corporate debt (lower left
panel) and to mortgage debt (lower right panel). 95% condence bands obtained via bootstrap.
5 Robustness analysis
In this section, we test the robustness of the results vis-à-vis the time period considered for the econometric
analysis and for alternative specications of the structural CVAR model.
Let us begin by assessing how the inclusion of the Great Recession in our sample period has aected the
econometric results of the models. More specially, we jettison the post-2008 observations, and we estimate
the model for the period from 1966 (Q1) to 2008 (Q3). The causal matrices in gure 10 show that the relations
entailed in the full-sample models robustly hold and there are only mild changes in the magnitudes of the
eects. Moreover, the impulse-response functions (cf. gure 11) conrm the results obtained employing the
whole sample: public debts shocks still spur output growth. The unique dierence is that the IRF of private
debt shifts up, suggesting that the Great Recession has reduced the (positive) impact of private debt on GDP
dynamics.
We then check the robustness of the results with respect to alternative model specications. First, we
consider alternative deators. In all the setting presented in section 4, real consumption and investment
has been obtained employing the GDP-deator. When we adopt the consumption and investment deators
(models 2df and 3df in table 3), the IRF results do not substantially change (see gure 12).13 Moreover, in model
6, (see table 3) we replace the 3-months T-Bill interest rate with the 10-years one (cf. table 1), as households
and rms might take their decision according to long-term interest rates. Results in gure 13 (left panel) are
consistent with the previously presented evidence. Finally, in model 7, we augment the baseline specication
adding government expenditure, to control for the main source of public debt and to possibly account for the
up to the 12th lag the household debt has a positive eect on consumption). Then, the interest rate is adjusted by the bank (typically
upward), possibly causing a negative eect on consumption.
13Also the results related to the causal structures, which are available from the authors upon request, are fully compatible with the
ones presented in models 2 and 3.
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Figure 10: SVAR causal matrices up to the second lag for the baseline model 1 estimated in the period 1966-
2008. The variables below the matrices cause the ones on the left.
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions, models 1nc. Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation shock to
public debt (upper panel) and to private debt (lower panel). 95% condence bands obtained via bootstrap.
15
0.000
0.002
0.004
0 10 20
Lags
v
a
lu
e
variable
c.i.
mean
dY/dB
−0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0 10 20
Lags
v
a
lu
e
variable
c.i.
mean
dY/dL
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0 10 20
Lags
v
a
lu
e
variable
c.i.
mean
dY/dB
−0.004
−0.002
0.000
0.002
0 10 20
Lags
v
a
lu
e
variable
c.i.
mean
dY/dL
Figure 12: Impulse response functions, models 2df (left) and 3df (right). Response of GDP to a 1% standard de-
viation shock to public debt (upper panels) and to private debt (lower panels). 95% condence bands obtained
via bootstrap.
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions, models 6 (left) and 7 (right). Response of GDP to a 1% standard devi-
ation shock to public debt (upper panels) and to private debt (lower panels). 95% condence bands obtained
via bootstrap.
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Figure 14: Impulse response functions, models 7. Response of GDP to a 1% standard deviation shock to public
expenditure. 95% condence bands obtained via bootstrap.
magnitude of the scal multiplier. The results showed by the IRFs in gure 13 (right panel) are consistent with
the previously presented evidence. In particular, public expenditure shocks has a positive impact on GDP (see
gure 14), suggesting a Keynesian transmission mechanisms for the positive eects of public debt.14
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the eects of public and private debt shocks on GDP dynamic employing a
battery of cointegrated VAR models, which have been identied employing the novel data-driven Independent
Component Analysis (ICA) in order to obtain structural models purged of ad-hoc theoretical restrictions.
The analysis of the ensuing impulse response functions shows that public debt shocks positively and
persistently aect GDP dynamics. In particular, we nd that public debt shocks crowd-in private consumption
and investment expenditure. We thus provide a fresh new piece of evidence to the debate on the role of public
debt on growth (see Reinhart and Rogo, 2010b; Cecchetti et al., 2011; Minea and Parent, 2012; Herndon et al.,
2013; Egert, 2015). Moreover, such a result appears to be robust to dierent model specications and to the
inclusion/exclusion of the Great Recession in the time sample.
At the same time, the eects of private debt are positive but milder, and they die out in the medium-run. In
addition, in line with recent growing literature (see Mian and Su, 2009; Jorda et al., 2013; Batini et al., 2016), we
nd a strong negative association between household mortgage debt and private consumption and GDP in the
medium-run. This result corroborates the hints from the nancial frictions literature (see e.g. Brunnermeier
et al., 2012) suggesting that nancial and real crises are generated by real asset bubbles interplaying with fast
mortgage debt expansions.
The coexistence of positive eects of public debt with negative ones stemming from household debt points
to the Janus-faced impact of debt on economic activity.
Our work could be extended in at least two ways. First, we could account for possible existing non-
linearities between public debt and GDP dynamics employing Threshold Vector Auto-Regression models (as
in Ferraresi et al., 2015; Proaño et al., 2014). Moreover, our analysis could be extended to other developed
14We also estimate models where we consider the ratio of public and private debt over GDP and richer specication encompassing
GDP, public debt, rm debt, mortgage debt, consumption, investment and the 3-month T-Bill interest rate. Our results hold also in
such models (the related IRFs are available from the authors upon request.)
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economies to search for possible heterogeneous eecst of public and private debt and the dynamics of the
economy.
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Appendix A The VARLiNGAM Algorithm
(1) Estimate the reduced form VAR model of equation (2) obtaining estimates Aˆi of the matrices Ai, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,p.
Denote by Uˆ the K × T matrix of the corresponding estimated VAR error terms, that is each column of Uˆ is
uˆt ≡ (uˆ1t, . . . , uˆKt)′, ∀ t = 1, . . . , T . Check whether the uit (for all rows i) indeed are non-Gaussian, and proceed
only if this is so.
(2) Use FastICA or any other suitable ICA algorithm (Hyvarinen et al., 2001) to obtain a decomposition Uˆ = PE where
P isK×K and E isK×T , such that the rows of E are the estimated independent components of Uˆ. Then validate
non-Gaussianity and (at least approximate) statistical independence of the components before proceeding.
(3) Let ˜˜Γ0 = P−1. Find Γ˜0, the row-permutated version of ˜˜Γ0 which minimizes
∑
i
1
|Γ˜0,ii| with respect to the per-
mutation. Note that this is a linear matching problem which can be easily solved even for high K (Shimizu et al.,
2006).
(4) Divide each row of Γ˜0 by its diagonal element, to obtain a matrix Γˆ0 with all ones on the diagonal.
(5) Let B˜ = I− Γˆ0.
(6) Find the permutation matrix Z which makes ZB˜ZT as close as possible to lower triangular. This can be formalized
as minimizing the sum of squares of the permuted upper-triangular elements, and minimized using a heuristic
procedure (Shimizu et al., 2006). Set the upper-triangular elements to zero, and permute back to obtain Bˆ which
now contains the acyclic contemporaneous structure. (Note that it is useful to check that ZB˜ZT indeed is close to
strictly lower-triangular).
(7) Bˆ now contains K(K − 1)/2 non-zero elements, some of which may be very small (and statistically insignicant).
For improved interpretation and visualization, it may be desired to prune out (set to zero) small elements at this
stage, for instance using a bootstrap approach (Shimizu et al., 2006).
(8) Finally, calculate estimates of Γi, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,p for lagged eects using Γi = (I− Bˆ)Aˆi.
Appendix B Testing the Assumptions of the ICA Algorithm
At the base of our causal search algorithm stand two important assumptions:
• A1: the residuals are linear combinations of underlying components that are mutually independent;
• A2: the residuals are linear combinations of underlying components that are non-Gaussian (with at most one of
them Gaussian).
But the second assumption might also be relaxed and replaced by its milder version:
• A2 bis: the residuals are linear combinations of underlying components that are jointly non-Gaussian.
The typical assumption required for SVAR is orthogonality – i.e. absence of dependencies in the rst moment –
which is testable. Our causal search strategy instead requires independence – i.e. absence of dependencies in all the
moments – that instead cannot be tested. Testing for absence of correlation at least, allows us to obtain a rst indication
for the fact that, the assumption is not rejected (up to the rst order). We test this via a bivariate graphical inspection
and via simple OLS regressions. The results in gure 15 are presented only for the rst model for sake of brevity, but
for all the models presented in table 3 the results are very similar, indicating that the structural shocks do not present
clear patterns and that we cannot reject the independence assumption.15
15Results and graphs for the other models are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 15: Independence test on the structural residuals of the baseline models 1.
Also a statistical analysis by means of OLS suggest that this is the case. In fact by running simple linear regressions
of the type:
εi = βεj
where i and j stand for the residuals of two dierent variables, allows one again to check whether some linear
relations between the structural residuals εi and εj exists. Table 5 presents the results for the rst baseline model. For
the others models the results are very similar and allow us to conclude that in this case the independence of the structural
shocks is an assumption which is satised. Indeed only few times some parameters result slightly signicant at the 5%
while they never are at the 1%, indicating that their independence might be a not too much restrictive assumption in
this case.
The second assumption is instead more easily testable and we do that via Shapiro-Wilk test for normality on the
residuals. The (reduced form) residuals are linear combinations of the underlying components (the structural shocks)
and since a linear combination of Gaussian components would necessarily imply Gaussian residuals as well, if the
residuals are non-Gaussian, they must have been generated by non-Gaussian components.16 In table 6 we check that
the assumption A2 or that at least its milder version, A2 bis is satised. From the rst row, it is easy to see that at least
the assumption A2 bis is always satised. After a more detailed check, we see that the strict version is satised in 3 out
of 5 cases (the models with ID 1, 2 and 4). We therefore conclude that the conditions are met and the ICA algorithm is
here applicable quite safely.
16Notice here that the rejection of H0 stands for non-Gaussianity.
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Equation Coecient Standard Error t statistic p-value
Y = f(B) -0.08658981 0.04535515 -1.9091505 0.05774169
Y = f(L) -0.04699905 0.08438565 -0.5569554 0.57820994
Y = f(R) 0.15871436 0.06997094 2.2682896 0.02443041
Y = f(B,L) -0.08485211 0.04570988 -1.8563190 0.06495647-0.03061003 0.08431399 -0.3630480 0.71697261
Y = f(B,R) -0.07105341 0.04569677 -1.5548891 0.121636600.13977211 0.07076914 1.9750431 0.04971154
Y = f(L,R) -0.06442700 0.08376427 -0.7691466 0.442761330.16355376 0.07032789 2.3255889 0.02109609
Y = f(B,L,R)
-0.06774527 0.04612290 -1.4687989 0.14354977
-0.04929656 0.08414325 -0.5858647 0.55866539
0.14435692 0.07132240 2.0240053 0.04437743
Table 5: OLS regressions allowing to check for independence of the structural shocks
Variable ID 1 ID 2 ID 3 ID 4 ID 5
joint 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
uY 0.001 0.001 0.062 0.004 0.100
uB 0.028 0.024 0.014 0.540 0.001
uL 0.879 0.113 0.378
uF 0.062
uH 0.295
uI 0.941 0.072
uC 0.030 0.107
uR3m 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 6: Shapiro-Wilk test for non-Gaussianity p-values. H0 = Gaussianity
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